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Abstract – By making use of a 4000 firms database, this paper analyzes the dynamics of division of 
labour among Italian manufacturing firms during the '90s, and seeks to assess the impact that 
subcontracting has on manufacturing firms' growth. In particular, we investigate the relationship 
between labour division and firms' growth with three specific objectives: a) to understand whether 
and how subcontracting may have affected firms' growth dynamics; b) to test if larger growth could 
be due to stronger incentives to innovate for subcontracting firms and c) to study the joint influence 
of subcontracting and location in Southern Italy on growth. The main results are that i) the 
propensity to carry out subcontracting activities is relevant for growth, especially when allowing for 
a nonlinear relationship between growth and subcontracting; ii) more innovative subcontracting 
firms are also more susceptible to grow and iii) the deep dualism of the Italian industrial structure is 
once again confirmed, as Southern subcontractors show poorer performances and slower growth. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper concerns performances and growth of the Italian manufacturing firms involved in the 
chain of subcontracting and outsourcing. This is a field of research relatively little explored: while, 
as we will see, the features and the effects of recent changes in the pattern of regional and 
international labour division among firms have been widely investigated from a macroeconomic 
perspective, there are only very few firm based studies. Our analysis starts from the half of 90’s, 
when a long period of exogenous and endogenous shocks begins, leading to a profound change in 
the model of labour division among firms in most of European countries. The geographic 
fragmentation of the productive activities and the consequent “globalization” in the markets of the 
intermediates are the most evident and known effects of that process. In Italy this involves a 
deepening of inter-firm vertical relations and an upgrading of subcontractors’ role. These latter, 
once bound to be “captive suppliers”, confined to merely operative tasks in a monopsonistic context 
crowded by faceless transactions, progressively evolve. Subcontractors often become agents 
suitable to take part in trans-national productive networks, able to hold complementary rather than 
subordinate relationships with buyers. Interestingly, despite the deep changes occurring in those 
years, the geographic duality in the structure of Italian industry remains steadily persisting. 
Southern industry gets certainly involved in the international process of production scattering; 
however it proves still to be characterised by poor performances in terms of both productivity and 
profitability. 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between labour division and firms’ growth in 
the Italian manufacturing industry in the second half of 90’s. More specifically, the objectives of the 
paper are:  a) to understand whether and how subcontracting1 may have affected firms’ growth 
dynamics;   b) to test if a possible larger growth could be due to the stronger incentives to innovate 
for subcontracting firms wishing to upgrade along the value chain, consistent with the recent 
interpretations of the Global Commodity Chain approach; and c) to study the joint influence of 
subcontracting and location on growth by testing in particular if Southern subcontractors show 
growth dynamics significantly different from North and Center subcontracting firms.  
The literature on firm growth is definitely ample, dating back at least to the Gibrat law of 
proportionate growth (Mansfield, 1962). The novelty of our approach concerns the focus on the 
organizational choice as a key element to account for growth. Surprisingly, so far little attention has 
been devoted to the linkage between labour division and growth, even in countries such as Italy and 
Japan which have founded much of their competitive advantage on a peculiar pattern of firms’ 
labour division (Yasuda, 2005). 
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The paper outline is the following. After this introduction, section 2 describes some major 
features of the current pattern of firms’ labour division. Section 3 recalls the basics of the GCC 
approach as a useful background for the empirical investigation. This latter is the object of section 
4, in turn splitted into three subsections: the first presents data and some descriptive statistics; the 
second describes estimation methods and the third illustrates main results. It has to be highlighted 
that explanatory variables include a) standard variables such as age, size and past growth; b) 
organizational variables such as subcontracting, product innovation and ICT investment c) the 
geographic variable “localization”, which assumes a particular relevance with respect to the purpose 
of detecting possible differences in the growth of Southern and Centre-Northern firms. Section 5 
draws out main conclusions. 
 
2. The structure and the evolution of the value chain 
The last 15 years have witnessed an increasing fragmentation of production activities mainly 
occurred through outsourcing and offshoring2. This process has originated for most industries a 
worldwide value chain3 so that competition has taken place not only on the market of final goods 
but also for intermediates. As a consequence, the role of firms in the international labour division 
has become increasingly relevant in determining the overall comparative advantage of countries 
(Feenstra e Hanson, 2001; Hummels et al., 2001). 
The reasons of international fragmentation are several. We could first mention the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and transportation costs which brings brought about a reduction of 
costs of temporary exportation for outward processing and includes developing countries in the 
international labour division network as low cost producers of intermediate inputs4. Second, the 
development and diffusion of ICT fosters the widening and spreading of the international 
subcontracting network. As maintained by Coase (1937), the development of ICT allows to shrink 
coordination costs among the network’s agents and make geographical proximity less relevant. 
Finally, a substantial role is played by offshoring: FDI contributes to production fragmentation as 
multinational firms often include subcontractors of different countries in their outsourcing 
networks5. The spatial reorganization of labour division involves a permanent structural change: 
markets get wider, specialised producers are born and grow up, holdup costs diminish so that the 
organizational choice based on outsourcing activities to independent input suppliers becomes more 
efficient (McLaren, 2000).  
The Italian industry gets involved in the globalization of intermediate inputs only recently, 
in the second half of 90’s, when the increasing competition by Eastern Europe and Asia producers 
is made harsher by currency appreciation due to the constraints imposed to join EMU. This leads to 
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a serious productivity slowdown, and a reduction of exports and market shares6. Italian firms react 
by taking actively part in the international reorganization of labour division. While general 
industrial statistics do not satisfactorily describe the size and intensity of this phenomenon, a 
number of case studies witness the effort of Italian firms toward the international delocalization (for 
example, Tattara et al., 2006 and Mariotti et al., 2008). According to Unioncamere Report (2006), 
77% of medium sized firms have suppliers abroad. The changes of organizational choices concern 
even the Central and Eastern regions of the country, i.e. the areas where the “industrial district 
model” prevails. Although districts have been traditionally well “self contained”, and founded 
comparative advantage on local spillovers, today about 2/3 of firms resort to subcontractors 
localized outside the region and/or country7. Unlike, in Southern regions the subcontracting network 
is still usually organised on a local basis, as 2/3 of firms hinge on provincial suppliers. This 
evolution points out the marginal position of Southern Italian manufacturing firms in the current 
international labour division (Giunta and Scalera, 2006 and 2007). 
Together with spatial organization, another distinctive feature of the new pattern of labour 
division is the “geometry” of subcontracting. This is characterised by a pyramid shaped structure: 
the leader firm is at the top; just below it, there are primary subcontractors, i.e. a selected and 
restricted number of subcontractors which set up and run direct relationships with the principal. 
Primary subcontractors carry out specific investments with high switching costs. They have a 
narrow set of customers and therefore bear a high hold up risk8. Leader and primary subcontractors 
have repeated relationships formalised by renewed contracts. Sometimes subcontractors hold 
equity; often the leader grants technical assistance. In the layers under primary subcontractors there 
are several minor level subcontractors which are not directly related to the leader but only to upper 
stage of the chain. This framework puts together the advantages of a scattered production and a 
centralised responsibility given that each outsourcer faces a small number of subcontractors. Every 
agent (but the leader and final subcontractors) play a twofold role of principal and agent9. The 
overall network results to be a complex structure with significant problems of hierarchy and 
governance for leaders. These latter are usually final good assemblers or distributors (retailers) who 
manage the functions with the highest added value (R&D, design, engineering, marketing) and have 
the ability to face international transaction costs. 
   
3. Value chain and firms’ growth 
The effects of the changes in labour division among firms on efficiency and growth (both systemic 
and of firms involved in the subcontracting/outsourcing chain) have been analysed by literature 
from different viewpoints10. A theoretical approach particularly interesting for our purposes is the 
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one adopted by the Global Commodity Chain analysis (henceforth GCC) proposed by Gereffi 
(1994), and then followed by Kaplinsky (2000) and  Henderson et al. (2002) The peculiarity of this 
approach is its focus on firms’ growth within a context of value chain. In this setting, the location of 
firms along the chain is crucial in determining their performance and growth. On this point, Gereffi 
(1999) outlines a distinction between two types of production chains: a buyer driven commodity 
chain, common among labour intensive industries such as textiles and shoes, and a producer driven 
commodity chain, typical of industries such as automobile, electronics and civil aviation. In both 
the kinds of chain, the key players directly carry out only the highest return activities both upward 
(design, engineering) and downward (marketing, retail). These yield high rents while the simplest 
manufacturing activities are the most exposed to increasing global competition. 
The GCC theory identifies four non mutually exclusive expansion paths for subcontracting 
firms: a) to increase its x-efficiency; b) to strengthen inter-firm connections with their partners to 
build up a network more consistent and cooperative than rivals; c) to introduce new products or to 
widen the range of products supplied and d) to improve the quality of its functions along the chain, 
or to move to higher quality functions (from production to design, for example). We believe that 
options a) and b) do constitute requirements to take part in the network but do not warrant per se 
against the risk of a future decline. Conversely, options c) and d) are the key choices leading to 
higher returns and growth. 
This interpretation helps to explain some recent empirical evidence for Italy, like the harsh 
selection of small and medium sized subcontractors in textile and shoes industries which took place 
in the 90’s through the exit of many marginal producers. Also, the GCC allows to give a rationale to 
the dynamics of upgrading of many subcontracting firms in Northern and Central regions such as  
Veneto (Amighini and Rabellotti, 2003) and  Marche (Corò and Grandinetti, 1999), or even to the 
changes in the specialization of some industrial districts moving from the production of final 
consumption commodities to machinery and equipment employed in the those same industries (De 
Arcangelis and Ferri, 2005). As we will explain in detail, in our econometric estimation we will 
seek to take into account the firms’ possible upgrading in the value chain by considering variables 
connected to firms’ productive innovation11. 
 
4. The empirical investigation 
The main objectives of this investigation are three. First, we aim at studying the relationship 
between subcontracting intensity (i.e. the ratio between subcontracting and total sales) and firm 
growth (as relative increase of sales or employed). The working hypothesis is that subcontractors, 
once emancipated from their traditional condition of inferiority with respect to their customer, may 
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have carried out performances comparable or even better than other firms. This idea is consistent 
with our considerations above and recent literature bearing out significant positive relationships 
between subcontracting and respectively survival rates (Mazzola and Bruni, 2000), ROE and ROI 
(Innocenti, 2003) or input productivity and return (Giunta and Scalera, 2007, for Central and 
Northern Italy firms)12. Second, we intend to test whether the growth of subcontracting firms is due 
to the ability to innovate to gain an upgrading in the value chain, consistently with the predictions of 
GCC theories. Finally, the third objective is the evaluation of possible geographic differences in the 
relationship between subcontracting intensity and growth. 
As a by-product, our investigation also tests the relevance of the neutrality result known as 
“Gibrat law of proportionate growth”. According to this, firm growth rate is stochastic, and 
therefore independent from its size, uncorrelated to the past values of growth and not linked to other 
explanatory variables. There is a wide theoretical and empirical literature on Gibrat law. On the 
theoretical ground, the most relevant criticism comes from models of firm learning inspired to the 
seminal work of Jovanovic (1982), tracing out a negative relationship between firm growth rate and 
age. Other contributions, such as Sutton (1997) and Hart (2000), confute the hypothesis of no serial 
correlation for growth rate by showing the strong persistence of growth. In the same vein, there is a 
large number of empirical works. A clear inverse relationship between growth rate and size and/or 
age is highlighted for the United States by Evans (1987a, 1987b) and for UK  by Dunne e Hughes 
(1994) (manufacturing) and Variyam e Kraybill (1992) (primary sector and services). These results 
are substantially confirmed by Audretsch et al. (1997, 1999) for Dutch firms operating in different 
industrial sectors and wholesale trade, Harhoff et al. (1998), who consider a sample of German 
firms, Mac Pherson (1996) for South Africa and Yasuda (2005), who shows the existence of a 
strong negative correlation between growth rate and age or initial size for a sample of 14000 
Japanese manufacturing firms. 
 
4.1. The data 
Before proceeding to the description of methods and results, we give briefly account of some salient 
features of our data and make a short descriptive analysis of the growth performance of our sample 
firms. Our investigation is based on the dataset made available by the VII and VIII issue of 
Capitalia “Survey on manufacturing firms”, regularly carried out every three years13. Capitalia 
surveys collect data on a large number of variables. In particular, the VII wave, concerning the 
period 1995-1997, contains 4497 observations while the VIII wave (1998-2000) supplies 4680 
observations. However only 1299 firms are sampled in both issues. The surveys are based on a 
stratified sample of firms with not less than 11 employed, including the whole population of firms 
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with more than 500 employed.  Every firm answers to a detailed questionnaire which asks to 
indicate the values of a large number of variables for the current year and in some cases for the 
previous one or two years. In particular, the question on subcontracting is referred only to the 
current year. Moreover, each firm supplies 10 year time series concerning a number of balance 
sheet variables, among which no additional information on subcontracting is included. 
Tables 1 and 2 show yearly average growth rates of real sales and employed for the periods 
1995-97 and 1998-2000 for a) small (11 to 100 employed), medium sized (101 to 500 employed) 
and large (beyond 500 employed) firms; b) Centre-North and Mezzogiorno14 firms and c) absolute 
subcontractors (firms producing only on order), strong subcontractors (more than 50% of total 
sales), weak subcontractors (less than 50% of total sales) and non-subcontractors. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Tables 3 and 4 record the results of tests on differences ANOVA which turn out to be 
statistically significant in most cases. Tables supply valuable information. All groups are 
characterised by positive growth rates (quite high for growth rates of employed). The differences 
among small, medium sized and large firms are little relevant: medium firms grow slightly more 
than others, while small firms grow more in tems of employed. About geographical differences, 
Centre-North firms show higher growth rates of both sales and employed, with the only exception 
of no subcontractors. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 Insert Table 4 about here 
When focusing in more detail on subcontracting intensity, the evidence looks mixed. The 
groups ONSUB and HISUB get the highest growth rats of real sales (but not of employed). In any 
case, however, each of the middle groups (LOSUB and HISUB) have higher rates than the closer 
extreme group (respectively NOSUB and ONSUB). This raises the point of a possible non 
monotonic (i.e. increasing and then decreasing) relationship between growth rate and 
subcontracting intensity. By looking at the table by rows, one can also notice that this pattern is 
common to any firm size and to the overall group of firms localized in Central and Northern 
regions. The only exception concerns Southern firms for which growth rates always shrink with 
subcontracting intensity15. 
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4.2. The estimation method 
We estimate the following three equations for growth in terms of both real sales and employed. 
itititititititititit uINPICTAVKSUBSUDAGEyyy +++++++∆++=∆ −− 3212131211 βββγγθθθα ,        (1) 
itit
ititititititititit
uIXS
INPICTAVKSUBSUDAGEyyy
++
+++++++∆++=∆ −−
4
3212131211
β
βββγγθθθα
   (2) 
and 
itititit
ititititititititit
uINPICTAVK
SXSSXSSUBSUBSUDAGEyyy
++++
+++++++∆++=∆ −−
321
2
54
2
32131211
βββ
γγγγγθθθα   (3) 
where i is the firm, t=1,2 the survey of 1998 or 2001, ity  is the log of real sales SAL or the log of 
the number of employed EMP; AGE is the log of firm age (years); SOU is a dummy taking on value 
1 if the firm is localized in Southern regions; SUB subcontracting intensity (as share of 
subcontracting on sales); AVK is the ratio added value over capital, a typical indicator  of 
productivity; ICT ed INP are two dummies, which we consider proxies of the firms’ attitude to 
innovate. They take unit value if during the last three years respectively the firm carried out ICT 
investments and introduced product innovation. The exact definition of these variables together 
with the main descriptive statistics is reported in Table 5. Finally, ity∆  is the first difference 
1−− itit yy . A possible significance of parameter θ indicates the dependence of growth rate from the 
initial value 1−ity , while significance of θ2 would imply growth persistence. According to Gibrat 
law, both these parameters should not be significantly different from zero. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Interaction terms IXS and SXS are respectively the products between INP and SUB and 
between SOU and SUB. In equation (4), IXS is introduced to assess the impact of innovation on the 
sensitiveness of growth to subcontracting intensity. As shown above, within the set of 
subcontractors, GCC theories distinguish a group of innovative firms able to upgrade along the 
value chain and to grow more than others. In this view, the subcontracting firm should substantially 
benefit from innovation as this allows to gain a leader position in the value chain. For this reason, 
the expected sign of the IXS parameter is positive. Specification (2) permits to separately evaluate 
the marginal effect of innovation on growth for non subcontractors (the parameter 3β ) and for 
absolute subcontractors (the sum 43 ββ + ). 
The product SXS and the squared term in equation (3) aim at testing the hypotheses that the 
relationship between subcontracting intensity and firm growth be a) structurally different between 
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South and Centre-North and b) non linear. From (3), it is easy to show that the marginal effect of 
subcontracting on growth rate is SUB32 2γγ +  for Centre-North and to SUB)(2 5342 γγγγ +++  for 
Mezzogiorno. This implies that one can test the hypothesis of geographical structural differences in 
the relationship between subcontracting and growth by checking the statistical significance of 4γ  
and 5γ , which in turn correspond to the differences )( CNS 22 γγ −  e )( CNS 33 γγ − , where S and CN 
denote respectively parameters of regressions on subsamples relative to Southern and Centre-
Northern firms. Also, we can test non linearity by considering the statistical significance of 3γ  and 
5γ . Finally, in equation (3), the marginal effect of localization (i.e. the difference in the average 
growth between South and Centre-North) is equal to a 2541 2 SUBSUB γγγ ++ . Through 
specification (3), we can run regressions on the whole sample, with no need of distinct estimates for 
the two subsamples. 
Concerning the estimation method, our choices are strongly constrained by the nature of 
available data. In particular, since firms are requested to indicate the value of subcontracting 
intensity only for one year, our data seem suitable to be treated more like a pool than a panel for at 
least two reasons. First, the number of firms sampled in both the surveys is just above 25% of cases, 
which would have made the panel strongly unbalanced with a minor informational advantage with 
respect to a pool, or alternatively imposed to exclude many observations (almost all observations on 
Southern firms). Second, and most important, a panel would have prevented (at least in a fixed 
effects specification) from using the time invariant dummy variable SOU which in our analysis is 
crucial. 
The likely endogeneity of the variable SUB has advised to consider GIV estimates besides 
OLS, possibly affected by inconsistency. The unavailability of lagged data on subcontracting has 
brought about the problem of selecting suitable instruments. We chose as instruments some other 
variables drawn from Capitalia survey, i.e. ROI, AVL (the ratio added value/employed) and HUM 
(an indicator of human capital, in particular, the share of workers with a secondary school degree). 
These variables show relatively high correlation coefficients with SUB (not less than 0.40)16. Also, 
this set of instruments allows not to reject the hypothesis that sovraidentification constraints hold. 
Finally, as we will see later, the involved results are quite similar to OLS estimates. 
  
4.3. The results 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results of OLS and GIV estimation of equation (1), (2) and (3), 
respectively for the growth rates of real sales and employed. A first remark concern the dependence 
of growth rates on the initial values of real sales and employed. The econometric investigation 
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shows that in all cases the growth rate is negatively related to the initial value with a significance 
level not lower than 5%. Theoretical growth rates are considerable for the lowest size (the growth 
rate of employed is larger than 30% for firms with 11 employed) but much lower as soon as size 
increases ((17% with 31 employed, 9% with 51 employed and 4% with 100 employed). Estimates 
of parameter θ2 indicate negative statistically significant growth persistence only for employed (and 
not for real sales), in accordance with previous literature on Italy (Contini and Revelli, 1989). The 
overall conclusion is that Tables 6 and 7 support the view of most of literature about the empirical 
lack of validity of Gibrat law. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Control variables AGE, AVK, ICT and INP show in almost all cases a relation with growth 
rates consistent with theoretical predictions. In particular, regressions confirm that firm’s age 
negatively affects the propensity to grow (but the link is statistically significant only for sales) while 
capital productivity, attitude to innovate and propensity to invest in ICT turn out to exert in most 
cases a positive impact on growth rates. This latter result seems to be particularly relevant, even if 
theoretically not surprising, as it contrasts recent solid literature (for example, Del Monte and 
Papagni, 2003 and Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006). 
Moving to results more closely connected to subcontracting, we first notice that in equation 
(1) subcontracting intensity, as well as geographic location, does not have a statistically significant 
effect on firm’s growth. In equation (2) the estimates of the parameters of control variables are 
almost unaltered with the exception of age, which looses significance in three out of four cases. The 
introduction of an interaction factor between INP and SUB allows to verify that for innovating 
firms an increase in subcontracting intensity leads to a larger impact on growth, probably because 
this type of firm is better positioned in the value chain. In fact the coefficient of the variable IXS is 
positive and statistically significant (slightly above 5% for the growth of employed). Since the 
estimate of 2γ  in the linear specification does not significantly differ from zero, the only 
subcontracting firms actually growing are the ones which carry out product innovations. In the same 
vein, for non subcontracting firms, innovation does not seem to dramatically affect growth (in 
equation 2, estimated 3β  does not significantly differ from zero), while for subcontractors 
innovation comes out to be a crucial factor for growth  ( 4β  is significantly positive). 
When adopting the non linear specification (3), the effect of subcontracting on growth 
becomes definitely stronger. In fact, in this case the estimates of control variables’ parameters 
remain substantially unaltered while all γ turn out to be now statistically significant. In addition, 
results describe now a story of a deep geographical differentiation. The estimation of equation (3) 
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suggest that firms’ localization in Southern regions negatively affects growth performances. 
Moreover, the relationship between outsourcing and growth varies over the geographical areas we 
consider. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
In the case of Centre-North, this relation takes a reversed U shape with its highest value 
around 51% of subcontracting intensity for both the cases of real sales and employed. The marginal 
effect at the average value of subcontracting is always positive, between 0.22 and 0.31 for sales’ 
growth (1% increase in subcontracting intensity involves about 0.25% increase in (the growth) of 
real sales) and between 0.02 and 1.35 for the growth of employed. The theoretical forecast of sales’ 
growth varies among -4% for non subcontractors, +18% for firms with a 51% ratio 
subcontracting/sales and +3% for absolute subcontractors. Concerning the growth of employed, the 
theoretical forecast varies from -9% of non subcontractors to +33% of intermediate subcontractors 
to go back to -9% for absolute subcontractors. 
The reverse U-shaped relation does not hold for Mezzogiorno, where the impact of 
subcontracting is always negative at any value of subcontracting. At the average subcontracting 
intensity, the marginal effect is included between -0.18 and -0.57 for the growth of sales and 
between -0.09 and -0.14 for the growth of employed. The theoretical forecast of growth for both 
sales and employed is between +8% for non subcontracting firms to +1% for absolute 
subcontractors. 
With respect to the estimates of Tables 6 and 7, we made some robustness checks by using 
alternative proxies for firm productivity, return and attitude to innovation. These changes bring 
about minor effects on the coefficient estimates while sign and intensity of the relationship between 
growth and subcontracting are not significantly affected. 
Summarizing, our econometric investigation allows us to draw some relevant conclusions. 
First, in accordance with most of previous literature, the Gibrat law can be rejected, as variables 
such as age, initial size and past growth rates seem to be able to account for part of current firms’ 
growth. Second, subcontracting intensity turns out be a determinant factor of growth. Interestingly, 
our estimates highlight a non linear relationship between subcontracting and growth, for which 
firms with intermediate values of subcontracting intensity grow more than both absolute 
subcontractors and non subcontractors. Third, in accordance with previous literature, firms 
operating in Southern regions show significant peculiarities. For them, the relation between 
subcontracting and growth is monotonically decreasing. Finally, our results indicate that firms’ 
propensity to innovate and carry out ICT investments have a positive impact on growth rates. 
Notably, within the subsample of subcontracting firms, we verify that the most innovative firms are 
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the ones which grow faster. In this case, a larger share of subcontracting involves higher growth 
rates because they are best located in in the value chain and most able to get a leadership role in the 
chain. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the role of subcontracting in explaining firms’ growth and obtains three 
main results. First, consistent with most of the literature, the Gibrat law is rejected and the ability of 
variables such as age and past growth rates to account for current growth rates is recognized. 
Second, the propensity to carry out subcontracting activities turns out to be relevant for growth, 
especially when allowing for nonlinear relationships between growth and subcontracting. Despite 
the poor information available, we have also seeked to test how profitable propensity to innovate 
may be for subcontractors willing to upgrade their position in the value chain. Our results confirm 
that more innovative subcontracting firms are also more susceptive to grow. Even if not surprising, 
this result is remarkable as it supports the intuitions of the GCC approach often hinging only on 
anedoctical evidence. 
Finally, it is once again confirmed the deep dualism of the Italian industrial structure. In the 
Centre-North regions, firms with intermediate subcontracting intensity (close to 50%) emerge as the 
most dynamic group, showing the highest growth rates in terms of both real sales and employed, 
while Southern subcontractors show slower growth and poorer performances. These results lead to 
believe that, in the current pattern of international labour division, Southern subcontracting firms 
seem bound to play a marginal role and to be increasingly exposed to the risk to be loosers in the 
competition with their rivals of emerging countries. 
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Notes 
 
1 We adopt a wide definition of subcontracting, including procurement of both specific components or services and 
more complex intermediate inputs.  
2 Here we consider outsourcing (local, national or international) as the relocation of activity outside the firm to an 
independent input supplier (subcontractor) and offshoring as the relocation of activity to a different country but within a 
structure belonging to the firm. 
3 A value chain is the set of activities for production and sale of commodities. It is worldwide when activities are 
allocated across firms localised in different countries. For a survey on industrial subcontracting networks, see Sacchetti 
e Sugden (2003). 
4 Heintz (2006) points out that in the 70’s industrial export covered a share of 20% of total export. In 2000 that share 
had risen to 70%. See Hummels et al. (2001) on the increasing vertical specialization of countries.  
5 The impact of multinational firms’ investments on the local subcontracting network is documented by Dries e 
Swinnen (2004). 
6 From 1994 to 2005, the yearly labour productivity growth is on average around 0,5%. In the same period, the Italian 
share on total world exports reduces from 4.5% to 2.9% (2004). 
7 Reasons and features of the process of international outsourcing of Italian industrial districts are analyzed for example 
by De Propris et al. (2008). 
8 Even in the presence of specific investments, uncertainty, contract incompleteness and potentially opportunistic 
agents, firms more frequently resort to disintegration, outsourcing, market relations as repeated relations, cooperative 
solutions, reputation and selection of players look good instruments to shelter their specific investments (Holmstrom 
and Roberts, 1998). 
9 In the Italian wearing-apparel industry “the practice of outsourcing has become more and more common. So 
manufacturing activity has been progressively replaced by the function of outsourcing management which includes 
initial agreements with subcontractors, control over their activity, cooperation and continuous monitoring. From the 
subcontractors’ point of view, competition mainly operates through their ability to manage immaterial factors such as: 
selection and managemeent of outsourcing, engineering and development of production, logistics” (Hermes Lab, 2004). 
On the point, Kaplinski, 2000, p. 15 concerning Ford Motor Company writes: “Perhaps more significantly, the Ford 
Motor Company … has begun to increase its activities over the width of the chain (buying into after-market sparse, 
auto-leasing and marketing) and to reduce the depth of its activities in individual links, particularly in manufacturing 
(where it is even thinking of subcontracting assembly), previously its core economic rent”. 
10 The growth of firms belonging to networks is investigated for example by Riccaboni e Pammolli (2002) and Powell 
et al. (1999). Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2007) focus on the productivity advantages of outsourcers while Bergin et 
al.(2007) deal with intensity and volatility of growth connected to the increasing labour division. 
11 Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) discuss at length how insertion in global value chains define upgrading opportunities. 
12 However, one should not neglect that some studies (for example, Geroski, 1998) find poor correlation between 
performance indicators based on accounting measures and growth rates. 
13 In particular, descriptive statistics reported in Tables 1 to 5 are calculated on Capitalia (1998) and (2001) data, while 
Tables 6 and 7 supply the results of econometric estimations carried out by using data of the same source. When 
needed, data have been deflated by an ISTAT price index (NIC).  
14 Mezzogiorno is the Southern part of the Italian peninsula. In this work, as it is customary in the literature, it includes 
the regions Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia and Calabria plus the islands Sicilia e Sardegna. 
15 The same conclusions hold even when considering median growth rates (in parentheses in tables 1 and 2). At least for 
the growth of employed, median values are always much lower than mean values so that high average growth rates can 
be presumably due to a relatively low number of firms which grow very fast.  
16 Following the method suggested by Zivot and Wang (2006), we have regressed the variable presumably affected by 
endogeneity SUB on instruments and other explanatory variables to test the joint statistical significance of instruments. 
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Table 1 – Growth rates of real sales. Mean and median (in parentheses) values 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB Total 
Small 3.74 (1.04) 
3.97 
(1.93) 
7.14 
(3.99) 
5.94 
(3.08) 
5.31 
(2.10) 
Medium sized 4.43 (3.04) 
5.19 
(3.21) 
7.09 
(4.58) 
5.66 
(3.87) 
5.89 
(3.78) 
Large 5.06 (4.00) 
9.19 
(6.41) 
6.53 
(0.30) 
5.32 
(3.83) 
5.36 
(2.82) 
Centre-North 4.26 (1.73) 
4.54 
(2.16) 
7.23 
(4.14) 
5.90 
(3.40) 
5.50 
(2.41) 
Mezzogiorno 8.16 (3.32) 
6.53 
(2.70) 
0.15 
(1.08) 
4.02 
(0.90) 
5.22 
(1.76) 
Total 4.40 (1.79) 
4.66 
(2.16) 
7.05 
(4.04) 
5.61 
(3.20) 
5.46 
(2.26) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Growth rates of employed. Mean and median (in parentheses) values 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB Total 
Small 18.88 (9.09) 
25.17 
(24.23) 
9.98 
(3.18) 
9.40 
(1.44) 
17.42 
(8.31) 
Medium sized 15.83 (11.03) 
24.31 
(22.76) 
11.03 
(4.69) 
9.24 
(3.88) 
15.54 
(9.87) 
Large 19.74 (16.65) 
19.53 
(23.13) 
14.87 
(8.68) 
9.22 
(0.83) 
16.01 
(10.60) 
Centre-North 19.37 (10.53) 
25.82 
(25.00) 
10.30 
(7.56) 
9.55 
(2.02) 
16.99 
(8.11) 
Mezzogiorno 19.74 (18.18) 
13.81 
(5.88) 
8.87 
(3.51) 
8.45 
(1.61) 
12.04 
(6.14) 
Total 19.44 (9.72) 
24.86 
(23.63) 
10.13 
(5.63) 
9.39 
(2.00) 
16.59 
(7.84) 
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Table 3 – Growth of real sales. ANOVA tests of mean equality (t and F 
values) 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB 
NOSUB  –     
LOSUB 0.086 0.007 –   
HISUB 3.873*** 14.997*** 
2.989*** 
8.936*** –  
ONSUB 5.109*** 26.105*** 
3.059*** 
9.359*** 
3.537*** 
12.289*** – 
Test on mean equality over all the groups: F=11.709*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Growth of employed. ANOVA tests of mean equality (t and F 
values) 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB 
NOSUB  –     
LOSUB 7.216*** 52.069*** –   
HISUB 16.256*** 264.249*** 
8.380*** 
70.224*** –  
ONSUB 29.075*** 845.331*** 
11.933*** 
142.387*** 
0.174 
0.030 – 
Test on mean equality over all the groups: F=11.709*** 
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics 
 Description Obs Mean Max Min SD 
EMP Number of employed 9163 103.85 12630 11 369.18 
AGE Age of firm (in years) 9115 23.57 182 0 18.03 
AVK Ratio added value / invested capital 7713 0.04 2.58 -0.18 0.06 
AVL Ratio added value / number of employed* 7721 24.95 550.88 -35.62 29.90 
EXP Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm exports 9134 0.69 1 0 0.46 
SAL Real value of sales** 9134 41.30 8645.71 0 221.3 
HUM 
Share of workers with a with a secondary 
school degree 8149 0.40 1 0 0.26 
ICT Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm makes ICT investments 8501 0.78 1 0 0.41 
INP Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm makes product innovation 9174 0.19 1 0 0.40 
ROI Value of ROI 7721 0.20 5.52 -4.58 0.71 
SUB Share of subcontracting on sales  9107 0.48 1 0 0.47 
SOU Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm is localized in a Southern region 9177 0.13 1 0 0.34 
The number of observations for each estimation changes due to the different number of valid answers 
to the questionnaire. One asterisk indicates values expressed in million liras; two asterisks values 
expressed in billion liras. 
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Table 6 – The determinants of growth rates (real sales) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS GIV OLS GIV OLS GIV 
Log SAL -0.0057** (0.0020) 
-0.0205** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0057** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0408*** 
(0.0131) 
-0.3420** 
(0.1670) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0049) 
∆SALt-1 3.92E-06 (2.86E-06) 
4.61E-06 
(3.12E-06) 
3.92E-06 
(2.86E-06) 
4.85E-06 
(12.9E-06) 
-5.86E-05 
(5.01E-05) 
8.08E-06 
(9.01E-06) 
Log AGE -0.0438*** (0.0087) 
-0.0474*** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0438*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0113 
(0.0513) 
-0.0455** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0377*** 
(0.0074) 
SOU 0.0148 (0.0177) 
0.0075 
(0.0237) 
0.0148 
(0.0177) 
-0.0252* 
(0.0136) 
-0.09010 
(0.5230) 
0.1215 
(0.4209) 
SUB 0.0026 (0.0104) 
0.0098 
(0.0123) 
0.0019 
(0.0121) 
0.0017 
(0.0208) 
3.6336** 
(1.5141) 
2.6492*** 
(0.8710) 
SUB2 – – – – -3.5408** (1.4119) 
-2.5768*** 
(0.8484) 
SXS – – – – -4.6440** (2.2994) 
-2.9665*** 
(0.8841) 
SXS2 – – – – 4.0087** (1.7570) 
2.7327*** 
(0.8671) 
AVK -4.88E-05 (10.4E-05) 
-3.18E-04 
(3.30E-04) 
-4.90E-05 
(10.4E-05) 
-2.25E-04 
(2.32E-04) 
0.0013* 
(6.81E-04) 
3.66E-04** 
(1.78E-04) 
ICT 0.0421*** (0.0101) 
0.0494*** 
(0.0157) 
0.0421*** 
(0.0101) 
0.0337** 
(0.0169) 
0.2161** 
(0.0099) 
0.0291* 
(0.0151) 
INP -3.66E-04 (0.0108) 
-0.0078 
(0.0136) 
-0.0018 
(0.0168) 
-0.0688 
(0.1078) 
0.1451 
(0.1108) 
-0.0076 
(0.0135) 
IXS – – 0.0378** (0.0190) 
0.1970** 
(0.0866) – – 
Constant 0.2455*** (0.0517) 
0.0205*** 
(0.0078) 
0.2458*** 
(0.0517) 
0.4582** 
(0.2297) 
2.8972** 
(1.4201) 
0.1033 
(0.0683) 
Observations 7047 6919 7047 6919 7047 6917 
R2 0.0964 – 0.0965 – 0.2521 – 
Marginal effect 
CN  – – – – 0.3052 0.2248 
Marginal effect  
SOU – – – – -0.5706 -0.1764 
Turning point  
CN – – – – 0.5131 0.5145 
Turning point 
SOU – – – – 1.0797 1.0678 
OIR test – 3.3498 – 4.0073 – 4.3923 
OIR test on validity of overidentifying restrictions is carried out by the Newey e West (1987) statistic, which 
distributes like a 2χ  with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of instruments 
(included exogenous variables) and the number of parameters to be estimated. 
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Table 7 – The determinants of growth rates (employed) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS GIV OLS GIV OLS GIV 
Log SAL -0.1499*** (0.0240) 
-0.1606*** 
(0.0250) 
-0.1501*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.1974*** 
(0.0546) 
-0.1508*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.1450*** 
(0.0271) 
∆SALt-1 -0.8742*** (0.3197) 
-0.8013** 
(0.3173) 
-0.8744*** 
(0.3199) 
-1.1202*** 
(0.1496) 
-0.8738*** 
(0.3202) 
-0.9144*** 
(0.3482) 
Log AGE -0.0177 (0.0137) 
-0.0295* 
(0.0176) 
-0.0179 
(0.0137) 
-0.0400 
(0.0612) 
-0.0162 
(0.0138) 
-0.0148 
(0.0250) 
SOU 0.0640 (0.0490) 
0.0365 
(0.0659) 
0.0643 
(0.0492) 
0.0625 
(0.1115) 
0.0416 
(0.0480) 
0.0707 
(0.1579) 
SUB 0.0228 (0.0546) 
0.0404 
(0.0339) 
0.0226 
(0.0418) 
0.0390 
(0.1341) 
0.2018* 
(0.1133) 
16.4096*** 
(3.7725) 
SUB2 – – – – -0.1935* (0.1054) 
-16.0162*** 
(3.6694) 
SXS – – – – -0.3429* (0.1943) 
-16.6609*** 
(3.7292) 
SXS2 – – – – 0.2514* (0.1382) 
16.1412*** 
(3.6551) 
AVK 0.0043*** (0.0009) 
0.0033*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0052*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0068*** 
(0.0013) 
ICT 0.1262*** (0.0233) 
0.1477*** 
(0.0254) 
0.1173*** 
(0.0236) 
0.1731** 
(0.0877) 
0.1239*** 
(0.0227) 
0.0312 
(0.0463) 
INP 0.0995** (0.0399) 
0.0792* 
(0.0427) 
0.0558 
(0.0583) 
-0.1424 
(0.2508) 
0.0982** 
(0.0400) 
0.0334 
(0.0494) 
IXS – – 0.5302*** (0.0675) 
0.4384* 
(0.2562) 
– – 
Constant 0.5439*** (0.0807) 
0.8394*** 
(0.2774) 
0.5517*** 
(0.0779) 
0.6408 
(0.7507) 
0.5446*** 
(0.0794) 
-0.2420 
(0.1928) 
Observations 7015 6889 7015 6889 7015 6889 
R2 0.1994 – 0.1995 – 0.1999 – 
Marginal effect 
CN  – – – – 0.0199 1.3544 
Marginal effect  
SOU – – – – -0.0867 -0.1372 
Turning point  
CN – – – – 0.5214 0.5123 
Turning point 
SOU – – – – 1.2185 1.0052 
OIR test – 4.6366 – 1.2004 – 1.2262 
OIR test on validity of overidentifying restrictions is carried out by the Newey e West (1987) statistic, which 
distributes like a 2χ  with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of instruments 
(included exogenous variables) and the number of parameters to be estimated. 
 
 
 
 
